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As of the end of 2019, the regime under President Bashar al-Assad, along 
with Russia and Iran, controls almost three-quarters of Syrian territory. De-
spite ongoing fighting for the last-remaining rebel stronghold of Idlib as 
well as fragmented territorial control in the north-east, the war in Syria has 
been decided militarily.
 • The “victor’s peace” in Syria makes clear the survival of the repressive and cor-
rupt Assad dictatorship, which still does not offer the large majority of the re-
maining population any security or life prospects.
 • The regime’s core elite currently consists of the president’s closest family mem-
bers – this includes his brother Maher and wife Asma.
 • After eight years of war, the Syrian military and economic elites cannot be 
clearly distinguished. No members of these elite groups can absolve themselves 
of the accusation of being, at least indirectly, co-responsible for horrendous 
human rights abuses.
 • Although Iran and Russia repeatedly ensured the regime’s survival during the 
course of war, their influence on the Syrian elite has declined recently.
Policy Implications
The Assad regime’s military victory has further narrowed the diplomatic op­
tions of European nations. An international reconstruction programme for 
Syria should be ruled out for the near future, as it would help to consolidate 
the current authoritarian and wartime economic structures. Germany should 
therefore focus on becoming increasingly engaged in related areas within a 
multilateral framework. This would entail increased documentation of human 
rights violations and a greater number of international prosecutions of such 
abuses.
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Syria in 2019: The Current Situation and the Emerging “Victor’s 
Peace”
As of the end of 2019, the regime under President Bashar al-Assad, along with its 
allies Russia and Iran, controls almost three-quarters of Syrian territory. The be-
ginning of this development, which in retrospect was probably decisive for the war, 
was marked by Russia’s massive intervention in Syria in September 2015, followed 
by the brutal recapture of the northern Syrian metropolis of Aleppo in 2016–2017. 
With the help of the Russian air force and various militia groups – some of which 
are financed by Iran – the forces of the Syrian regime managed to gradually retake 
the former rebel strongholds of Dar‘a in the south-west and the Ghouta to the east 
of Damascus as well as the surrounding areas of the central cities of Homs and 
Hama during 2017 and 2018. The opposition fighters living in these areas and large 
sections of the civilian population then fled to the only remaining rebel stronghold 
of Idlib in north-west Syria.
Since then, approximately 3 million people have been living in Idlib – about 
1.5 million of whom are internally displaced persons from other parts of the  country. 
While the humanitarian situation on the ground gradually deteriorated, the Rus-
sian–Turkish agreement of September 2018 ensured that the planned large-scale 
offensive of the Syrian regime was postponed. After the gradual erosion of Russia 
and Turkey’s arrangement – which included the Turkish containment of the radi-
cal Islamist group the committee for the liberation of Greater Syria (HTS – Hay’at 
Tahrir ash-Sham), which was formerly associated with al-Qaeda – the Syrian and 
Russian air forces launched their offensive at the end of April 2019. The ferocious 
fighting over Idlib from April to December 2019 resulted in the deaths of thousands 
of civilians and sparked new refugee movements within the surrounded region.
The region east of the River Euphrates is the second area still being contested 
in Syria. The announcement by President Trump on 7 october 2019 that uS troops 
would completely withdraw from Syria made an invasion by the Turkish military 
possible here. The incursion of Turkey’s ground troops led to the expulsion of the 
Kurdish People’s Defense units (YPG – Yekeniyen Parastina Gel), which had previ-
ously controlled large parts of this border region and enjoyed the protection of US 
troops in their struggle against the radical Islamic State (IS). Since Washington 
again changed its policy, deciding to leave a temporary contingent of uS troops in 
north-east Syria, Russia – as the most influential external actor in Syria – came to 
an agreement with Turkey at the end of october 2019 to establish a safe zone. The 
zone, controlled by the Turkish military, currently stretches about 100 kilometres 
from the cities of Tall Abyad to Ra’s al-‘Ayn along the Syrian–Turkish border. In 
response to the Turkish offensive, the Syrian regime also sent troops to the north-
east, thus contributing to the complex form of fragmented territorial control that 
is currently emerging in the region between the Kurdish YPG, the Syrian army, and 
the troops of Russia, Turkey, and the uS. The situation is fragile and could be fur-
ther destabilised by the possible regrouping of the IS, which saw many of its fighters 
manage to flee from the Kurdish-controlled prisons in north-east Syria in the course 
of the Turkish offensive.
Despite the ongoing fighting for Idlib in the north-west and the complex, frag-
mented territorial control in the north-east, in the wider context of the Syrian war, 
a “victor’s peace” is emerging for the regime under President Bashar al-Assad and 
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his key allies Russia and Iran. Therefore, in the near future, representatives of the 
Assad regime are likely to become increasingly important to the country’s domestic 
and foreign policy fortunes.
The Syrian Regime before and after 2011
Since 1970, Syria has been ruled by a presidential-authoritarian regime in which 
four mutually overlapping secret services played a central role. Internally – that 
is, vis-à-vis various members of the elite – these secret services carried out  mutual 
surveillance in order to specifically contain the danger of military coups, which 
characterised Syria up to the 1960s. Externally – that is, vis-à-vis large sections of 
the population – their task was to control, intimidate, and persecute individuals, 
families, and entire social groups. Syria is traditionally one of the most repressive 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.
In addition to repression, co-optation (i.e. the strategic linking of individuals 
and social groups to the ruling regime) constituted a second central mechanism for the 
exercise of power in Syria. Representatives of influential social groups were simul-
taneously bound to and made dependent on the regime through various means of 
patronage, such as the allocation of posts, money, and business opportunities. A 
precondition for the maintenance of such patron–client networks was the constant 
flow of resources, including opportunities for self-enrichment with impunity.
These traditional elements typical of the exercise of rule in Syria have been 
facing important processes of change since 2000 following the presidential succes-
sion. Whereas Hafiz al-Assad’s security services were complemented by the state 
bureaucracy and the Arab Socialist Ba‘th Party, two other central pillars of power, 
their influence has declined significantly under his son Bashar (Hinnebusch 2011). 
After taking power, Bashar al-Assad’s political focus was on further enhancing the 
 security apparatus. His younger brother Maher held a prominent position as com-
mander of the Syrian Republican Guard and the 4th Armoured Division of the Syrian 
army. At the same time, key security barons during the Hafiz period were stripped 
of power and replaced by loyal followers, many of them Alawi. [1] Also, a new class of 
crony capitalists emerged as a result of the economic reforms that were introduced 
after the turn of the century. Rami Makhlouf, the president’s cousin and Syria’s 
richest business person in the pre-war period, and the Sunni entrepreneur Muham-
mad Hamsho were the most prominent amongst this new economic elite (Daher 
2019a)
Against the backdrop of this regime structure, the Syrian uprising of March 
2011 – which was inspired by the uprisings in Egypt, libya, Tunisia, and Yemen – 
came as a shock to President Bashar al-Assad and the regime elite. The security 
apparatus reacted extremely violently to the first protests in Dar‘a in south Syria. 
However, rather than curbing them, it caused the anti-regime demonstrations to 
spread throughout the country with the exception of the central cities of Aleppo 
and Damascus (De Juan and Bank 2015). In addition to the massive use of force by 
the regime at the beginning, three other overarching dynamics were responsible for 
rapidly transforming the Syrian uprising into a fully fledged, internationalised civil 
war: the militarisation of the state and opposition from summer 2011, the confes-
1 The Alawi are a Shiite 
Muslim community which, 
according to some esti-
mates, accounts for almost 
10 per cent of the Syrian 
population. The Assads 
and Makhloufs, the two 
most influential families in 
the Syrian regime today, 
are both of Alawi origin. 
However, the Syrian regime 
cannot be described as 
Alawi, as it has always in-
cluded Sunni and Christian 
actors.
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sionalisation of the state with Alawi–Sunni enemy images, and the regionalisation 
and internationalisation of the conflict actors.
The rapid and massive escalation of violence also meant that many soldiers de-
serted the Syrian army and joined some of the opposition rebels of the Free Syrian 
Army. However, these consisted almost exclusively of lower- and middle-ranked 
soldiers, as higher-ranked officers and representatives of the civilian elite remained 
largely loyal to the regime (Albrecht and Köhler 2018). Two exceptions were Manaf 
Tlass and Riyad Hijab. Tlass, son of the long-serving defence minister Mustafa Tlass 
(1972–2002), deserted in May 2011, while Riyad Hijab, former agriculture minister 
(2011–2012) and former prime minister (June–August 2012) turned his back on 
the Assad regime towards the end of summer 2012. However, these two high-profile 
cases were exceptions that confirmed the rule that members of the Syrian extended 
elites did not openly rebel against the regime during the Arab uprisings.
The Core Elite Today: More Assadi than Alawi
The composition of the Syrian core elite has not fundamentally changed during the 
eight-year war; though some new trends have been observed recently. one clear 
continuity, however, is that President Bashar al-Assad, as head of state and sym-
bolic figure of the political status quo, remains the most important decision maker 
at the national level. In addition, the influence of Bashar’s younger brother Maher, 
who is in charge of the Syrian Republican Guard and the 4th Armoured Division of 
the Syrian army, has remained constant and may even have grown. Having been 
in command during some of the war’s decisive battles, Maher was occasionally the 
regime’s most important decision maker after 2011. A more recent development is 
the growing role played by the president’s wife, Asma al-Assad, who has for many 
years been a key media figurehead for the regime: in August and September 2019 
the assets of the al-Bustan Foundation and Syriatel, one of Syria’s two largest tele-
communications providers and worth millions, were awarded to the Syria Trust for 
Development, which she controls.
What is of particular political interest about this transfer is that this fortune 
comes from Rami Makhlouf – Bashar al-Assad’s cousin and close friend since child-
hood and also Syria’s richest business person in the pre-war period. After war broke 
out in 2011, Rami Makhlouf publicly remained loyal to the regime. one can assume 
that his relative disempowerment, or at least the threat to his previously untouch-
able position, is intended to show that even members of the core elite, including the 
extended presidential family, are not untouchable in the current climate, which is 
economically precarious for the regime. The journalist Chloe Cornish suspects that 
Rami Makhlouf, as a business person, did not provide the regime with sufficient 
foreign currency and was therefore punished (cornish 2019). Another indication 
that Makhlouf has been marginalised is the closure of the Syrian Social Nationalist 
Party (SSNP) office and the disarmament of the armed al-Bustan militia in the port 
city of latakia in early September 2019 – both of which are headed by Makhlouf.
In addition to the three members of the presidential family who are particularly 
influential at this time, Syria’s core elite currently includes some of the key decision 
makers in the military arena. This is no surprise from the regime’s standpoint given 
the precarious state of war that has persisted since 2011. Accordingly, Major Gener-
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al Ali Mamlouk, the circassian head of the General Intelligence Directorate, is also 
a member of the Syrian core elite. In 2019, he was also appointed deputy president 
(The Syrian observer 2019). Previously, other top representatives of the security 
apparatus old guard – namely, Major General Jamil al-Hassan, an Alawi and head 
of the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, and Fahd Jassem al-Freij, a Sunni and 
former defence minister (2012–2018) – belonged to the inner circle of Syrian deci-
sion makers.
overall, an Alawi family background continues to be important in the Syrian 
core elite which emerged in 2011. The power centre – currently represented by 
Bashar, his brother, and his wife Asma – is first and foremost committed to the con-
tinuation of the Assad family’s rule and not to the unfettered interests of the almost 
10 per cent of Alawi in the country. This latter point is evidenced not only by the 
marginalisation of Rami Makhlouf, who is also an Alawi, but also by the co-optation 
of high-ranking representatives of other ethnic groups from the security apparatus.
The Close Interdependence of Syria’s Military and Economic Elites
As a result of the ongoing war, which commenced in 2011, military and economic 
actors have become intertwined in numerous ways in the extended Syrian elite. 
Despite the existence of a small number of security barons who do not pursue their 
own business interests, the majority of the extended elite consists of various kinds 
of warlords, who always act as war entrepreneurs in addition to serving as military 
leaders.
on top of numerous reports of looting and pillaging – a typical form of self-en-
richment during war – there are a number of indicators of more systematic forms of 
cooperation between military heads and business leaders. The conquest of Darayya, 
south of Damascus, by regime troops in late summer 2016 provides a particularly 
perfidious example: Commander Maher al-Assad ordered that the remaining scrap 
metal be removed from the completely destroyed city and handed over to Muham-
mad Hamsho, a prominent crony capitalist of the regime and factory owner (cor-
nish 2019).
In addition to the cooperation between traditional elites, new economic elites – 
largely unknown before the war – have emerged in Syria. Today, the most well-
known figure in this respect is Samer Foz, a Sunni business person from Latakia, 
who is closely associated with the presidential family. Foz recently bought the pres-
tigious Four Seasons hotel in Damascus from Prince Walid bin Talal of Saudi Ara-
bia. He also owns the largest steel mill and sugar refinery in the country and is 
involved in car manufacturing. In recent years, Foz has been the main procurer of 
foreign currency for the regime, including for the key warmongers Bashar and Ma-
her al-Assad. Foz holds both a Syrian and a Turkish passport and had thus been able 
to travel internationally relatively flexibly. However, he has been on the European 
sanctions list since the beginning of 2019 and on the uS sanctions list since summer 
2019, which has significantly limited his international radius.
The brothers Hussam and Baraa al-Katerji are another example of new Syrian 
business elites who have become rich and politically influential since 2011 thanks to 
the war. Born in Raqqa on the Euphrates, they have close contacts with Arab tribes 
and Kurdish clans in the north-east and east of Syria. The two brothers made their 
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name by regularly trading oil with the IS during the group’s heyday in Syria (2014–
2016). This included not only oil production but also the safe transport of crude oil 
to refineries near Hama (Cornish 2019; Khatib and Sinjab 2018). For the purpose 
of carrying out these activities, the Katerji brothers created their own combat unit, 
which later sided with and fought for the regime in the course of the war. When the 
IS was defeated in Raqqa, its former Syrian “capital,” the Katerji brothers continued 
to trade oil – this time with the Syrian Kurds, who had taken the city.
Alongside the rise of new business people like the Katerji brothers, representa-
tives of the long-established economic elite have also been involved in financing 
 militias. For instance, Rami Makhlouf founded the al-Bustan associations, which 
have now been integrated into other combat structures, and also supported the 
leader of the so-called Tiger Forces, Suhail al-Hassan (Khaddour 2016).
Due to war-related developments, it is virtually impossible to distinguish be-
tween the military and economic elites in Syria. Accordingly, it is difficult to  imagine 
being able to absolve the members of these extended elites of the accusation of 
 being jointly responsible, at least indirectly, for the horrendous human rights viola-
tions of the Syrian regime.
The Reduced Influence of Russia and Iran in Syria
The military, financial, and – also partly – diplomatic support for the Assad  regime 
by Russia and Iran, its two most important external partners, was essential for its 
survival in various phases of the Syrian war. The commitment of these two states has 
repeatedly given the impression that Damascus is a puppet of Moscow or  Tehran. 
Although this is clearly an exaggeration, after 2015, the Syrian regime could rarely 
afford to openly oppose Russia’s proposals under President Vladimir Putin. By con-
trast, at the end of 2019, the Assad regime had much greater decision-making au-
tonomy than in previous years.
Above all, this stems from the change in Syria’s war situation: due to the emerg-
ing victor’s peace, the regime under President Assad is now less dependent than it 
has been in previous years on the Russian military in the air and Iranian- influenced 
militias on the ground. Nevertheless, Russia remains a decisive actor in the two 
 remaining battle zones in the north-west and north-east; therefore, the regime 
must not alienate Moscow under any circumstances. In contrast, Iran’s military 
involvement is limited in both combat zones.
In addition, the relative decline in military conflicts has led to a stronger focus 
on political processes, which are shaped in particular by the negotiations conducted 
by the United Nations in Geneva. It is thus expected that the existing differences of 
opinion between the Russian leadership and the Syrian regime will become increas-
ingly apparent. In the context of finding a political solution for Syria, Putin wants to 
be regarded internationally and regionally in the Middle East as a serious mediator 
and efficient negotiator of power, whereas Assad is not interested in granting any 
concessions.
In terms of being able to exert influence on the Syrian regime, Moscow currently 
has far better, more direct channels to Damascus than Tehran does. What is notice-
able is that people who were closer to Russia than Iran in the past have recently 
become more influential within the Syrian core elite. The prime example in this 
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 respect is Major General Ali Mamlouk, who has repeatedly expressed his solidarity 
with  Russia. In contrast, Maher al-Assad maintains a pro-Iranian position within the 
Syrian core elite, having closely coordinated military action with Iran’s Islamic Revo-
lution Guard corps in the past. In principle, however, President Bashar al-Assad 
always attempts to keep a certain balance between the influence of Russia and Iran.
Russia has strengthened its position vis-à-vis Iran not only with regard to the 
possible representation of interests within the Syrian core elite but also with regard 
to the economic treaties already concluded. While the two major Iranian projects 
in Syria – namely, the expansion of the Mediterranean port of latakia and the es-
tablishment of a third major telecommunications provider – have stalled and have 
failed to progress, Moscow has managed to conclude a number of lucrative major 
deals. These include the renovation and expansion of the Mediterranean port of 
Tartus and its management by the Russian company Stroytransgaz for a period of 
49 years. The Syrian minister of transport hopes that this project will result in in-
vestments of up to uSD 500 million (Daher 2019b). Stroytransgaz has also acquired 
a phosphate company in Khneifis near Hama and a fertiliser factory in nearby 
Homs. In addition, Russia has secured a 20 per cent stake in the Syrian oil sector.
The Options of Multilateral Policies on Syria
The following conclusions can be drawn from the changes in the Syrian regime, 
which were triggered by the war: with the core elite being narrowed down to Presi-
dent Assad and his closest family members, and with the military and economic 
power circles becoming acutely interdependent, it is highly unlikely that any mem-
ber of the Syrian elite has not been involved, at least indirectly, in human rights 
violations after eight years of brutal war. This is true even for allegedly neutral 
business people like Samer Foz, who – not for nothing – has been the target of Eu 
sanctions since the beginning of 2019. Thus, for the foreseeable future, neither Ger-
many nor Europe will be able to find an interlocutor at the higher level of the Syrian 
regime who has not been charged with a war crime or violating human rights.
With Assad’s emerging victor’s peace and Russia’s diminishing direct influence, 
the diplomatic possibilities of German and European policy to influence the Syrian 
regime via the Moscow “gang” as a moderator have diminished. The strategy to 
indirectly influence Damascus via Putin was always very risky and therefore un-
likely to have succeeded: it would have had to overcome not only the Assad regime’s 
complete lack of willingness to compromise but also the frosty relationship between 
Germany and Russia, which have become quite distant in recent years. Due to these 
reasons and the fact that military dominance remains virtually unbroken, the op-
tions for multilateral policies are clearly limited. Moreover, an international recon-
struction programme in Syria is also out of the question for now, since it could only 
be implemented in cooperation with the above-mentioned elites and would there-
fore strengthen the authoritarian and wartime economic structures (Heydemann 
2018; but IcG 2019).
Instead, Germany should focus its efforts on three areas within a multilateral 
framework. First, it would be extremely useful to intensify the documentation of 
human rights violations in Syria and to increase the number of international pros-
ecutions of such abuses. In october 2019, the successful prosecution by the Federal 
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Prosecutor General in Karlsruhe of two members of the Assad regime for torture 
was an important victory and should set a precedent (Baumstieger, Kampf, and 
Steinke 2019). Although such prosecutions will not improve the short-term situ-
ation in Syria, they are important medium- and long-term signs that some of the 
gravest human rights violations will be punished and do not allow the perpetrators 
of such crimes to feel entirely safe.
Second, aid programmes for those in real need of support in Syria and its neigh-
bouring states must continue beyond a victor’s peace. It is essential that European 
governments give substantially more consideration to developing concrete strate-
gies to help the civilian population in Idlib. This would entail trying to convince 
Turkey to temporarily open the border should we see the further displacement of 
hundreds of thousands of people forced to flee the region in north-western Syria 
due to the aerial bombardments by the Syrian and Russian air forces and the use 
of force by the HTS. With regard to Syria’s neighbours Jordan and lebanon, it is 
necessary to maintain their support for Syrian refugees. Together with the often 
precarious economic situation, anti-refugee discourse in the two countries – in ad-
dition to Turkey – has prompted tens of thousands of Syrians to return home de-
spite the risk of being captured and tortured by the Assad regime.
Third, various state and civil society actors in Europe should more staunchly 
advocate an open refugee policy than they have done to date. This would represent 
a particular challenge given the rise of right-wing populist and radical movements 
and parties, which have started to identify Syria as a supposedly “safe” country of 
return. Taking this position would no doubt provoke significant opposition amongst 
the right wing and contribute to increased polarisation. However, such an approach 
is absolutely vital in order to protect universal human rights and particularly vul-
nerable populations.
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